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Abstract
In cost sharing games with delays, a set of agents jointly uses a finite subset of resources. Each
resource has a fixed cost that has to be shared by the players, and each agent has a non-shareable
player-specific delay for each resource. A prominent example is uncapacitated facility location
(UFL), where facilities need to be opened (at a shareable cost) and clients want to connect to
opened facilities. Each client pays a cost share and his non-shareable physical connection cost.
Given any profile of subsets used by the agents, a separable cost sharing protocol determines cost
shares that satisfy budget balance on every resource and separability over the resources. Moreover,
a separable protocol guarantees existence of pure Nash equilibria in the induced strategic game
for the agents.
In this paper, we study separable cost sharing protocols in several general combinatorial
domains. We provide black-box reductions to reduce the design of a separable cost sharing
protocol to the design of an approximation algorithm for the underlying cost minimization prob-
lem. In this way, we obtain new separable cost sharing protocols in games based on arbitrary
player-specific matroids, single-source connection games without delays, and connection games
on n-series-parallel graphs with delays. All these reductions are efficiently computable – given an
initial allocation profile, we obtain a profile of no larger cost and separable cost shares turning
the profile into a pure Nash equilibrium. Hence, in these domains any approximation algorithm
can be used to obtain a separable cost sharing protocol with a price of stability bounded by the
approximation factor.
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1 Introduction
Cost sharing is a fundamental task in networks with strategic agents and has attracted a
large amount of interest in algorithmic game theory. Traditionally, cost sharing has been
studied in a cooperative sense, i.e., in the form of cooperative games or mechanism design.
Many of these approaches treat cost in a non-separable way and return a single, global cost
share for each agent. In contrast, when agents jointly design a resource infrastructure in large
networks, it is much more desirable to provide algorithms and protocols for separable cost
sharing that specify which agent needs to pay how much to each resource. Here the natural
approach are strategic cost sharing games with n players that use subsets of m resources.
Each resource generates a cost depending on the subset of players allocating it. A protocol
determines a cost share for each resource and each player using it. In addition to separability,
there are further natural desiderata for such protocols, such as budget-balance (distribute
exactly the arising cost of each resource) and existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE),
i.e., allow the resulting game to stabilize.
Perhaps the most prominent such protocol is the fair share protocol, in which the cost of
each resource is allocated in equal shares to the players using it. This approach has been
studied intensively (see our discussion below), but there are several significant drawbacks.
Even in connection games on undirected networks, it can be PLS-hard to find a PNE [51]
and the PoS (the total cost of the best Nash equilibrium compared to the cost of the optimal
allocation) is not known to be constant. This contrasts the fact that there are polynomial
time approximation algorithms with low approximation factors, see, e.g. [12]. For directed
networks the PoS can even be as large as Ω(logn) [4, 17].
In this paper, we study a slight generalization of cost sharing games, where every resource
has a shareable cost component and a non-shareable player-specific delay component. The
shareable cost needs to be shared by the players using it, the non-shareable player-specific
delay represents, e.g., a physical delay and is thus unavoidable. This setting arises in several
relevant scenarios, such as uncapacitated facility location (UFL) [37]. Here players share
the monetary cost of opened facilities but additionally experience delays measured by the
distance to the closest open facility. Another important example appears in network design,
where players jointly buy edges of a graph to connect their terminals. Besides the monetary
cost for buying edges, each player experiences player-specific delays on the chosen paths. In
such a distributed network environment, it is not clear a priori if an optimal solution can be
stable – i.e., if the shareable costs can be distributed among the players in a separable way
so that players do not want to deviate from it. This question leads directly to the design of
protocols that distribute the costs in order to induce stable and good-quality solutions of the
resulting strategic game.
Our results are three polynomial-time black-box reductions for the price of stability
(PoS) of separable cost sharing protocols in combinatorial resource allocation problems. Our
domains represent broad generalizations of UFL – arbitrary, player-specific matroids, single-
source connection games without delays, and connection games on undirected n-series-parallel
graphs with delays. In each of these domains, we take as input an arbitrary profile and
efficiently turn it into a profile having no larger cost and a sharing of the shareable costs such
that it is a Nash equilibrium. Our protocols are polynomial-time in several ways. Firstly,
the games we study are succinctly represented. In matroids, we assume that strategies
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are represented implicitly via an independence oracle. For connection games on graphs,
the strategies of each player are a set of paths, which is implicitly specified by terminal
vertices of the player and the graph structure. The cost sharing protocol is represented by a
strategy profile S and a sharing of the shareable costs arising in S on each resource. While
in principle the protocol must specify a sharing of the costs for all of the other (possibly
exponentially many) strategy profiles, one can do so implicitly by a simple lexicographic
assignment rule. It guarantees that the profile S becomes a PNE. As such, starting from an
arbitrary initial profile S′, we can give in polynomial time the Nash equilibrium profile S,
the cost shares for S, and the assignment rule for cost shares in the other profiles. Hence,
if S′ is polynomial-time computable, then both protocol and Nash equilibrium S are both
polynomial-time computable and polynomial-space representable.
1.1 Our Results
We present several new polynomial-time black-box reductions for separable cost sharing
protocols with small PoS. We study three domains that represent broad generalizations of
the uncapacitated facility location problem. In each domain, we devise an efficient black-box
reduction that takes as input an arbitrary strategy profile and computes a new profile of
no larger cost together with a separable cost sharing protocol inducing the new profile as a
PNE. Thus, any polynomial-time α-approximation of the social cost can be turned into a
separable cost sharing protocol with PoS at most α.
Matroidal Set Systems. In Section 3 we provide a black-box reduction for matroidal set
systems. Our results even apply to the broad class of subadditive cost functions that include
fixed costs and discrete concave costs even with weighted players as a special case. Here we
assume access to a value oracle for the subadditive cost function for each resource. Matroidal
set systems with player-specific delays include uncapacitated facility location as a special case,
since these correspond to matroid games, where each player has a uniform rank 1 matroid.
For metric UFL, there is for instance a 1.488-approximation algorithm [45] using ideas of a
previous 1.5-approximation algorithm [11]. This leads to a separable cost sharing protocol
with PoS equal 1.488. Also, the existing hardness results for UFL carry over, meaning that for
any polynomial-time computable, separable cost sharing protocol, the cost of an equilibrium
that can be computed in polynomial time is bounded from below by the inapproximability
bound. For metric UFL there is a lower bound of 1.46 [31].
Single-Source Connection Games with Fixed Costs. In Section 4 we consider cost sharing
games on graphs, where the set systems correspond to paths connecting a global source with
a player-specific terminal. We again provide a polynomial-time black-box reduction. Our
result improves significantly over the existing Prim-Sharing [17] with a PoS of 2. We obtain
separable protocols based on any approximation algorithm for Steiner tree, such as, e.g.,
the classic 1.55-approximation algorithm [49], or the celebrated recent 1.39-approximation
algorithm [12]. Our black-box reduction continues to hold even for directed graphs, where
we can use any algorithm for the Directed Steiner Tree problem [15], or games based on
the (directed or undirected) Group Steiner Tree problem [16, 26]. All lower bounds on
approximation hardness translate to the quality of polynomial-time computable equilibria of
polynomial-time computable separable protocols.
Connection Games With Delays. Finally, in Section 5 we study multi-terminal connection
games with delays and fixed costs. For directed graphs, an optimal Steiner forest is not
enforceable by a separable cost sharing protocol, even for two players [17]. Very recently,
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a similar result was shown even for two-player games on undirected graphs [35]. Thus,
for general graphs, we cannot expect separable protocols with optimal or close-to-optimal
equilibria, or (efficient) black-box reductions. We introduce a class of so-called n-series-
parallel graphs, which allows to obtain a black-box reduction in polynomial time. The
transformation directly implies that the n-series-parallel graphs always admit a separable
cost sharing protocol inducing an optimal Steiner forest as an equilibrium.
The reduction also applies to discrete-concave cost functions and player-specific delays,
however, we do not know if polynomial running time is guaranteed. n-series-parallel graphs
have treewidth at most 2, thus, for fixed edge costs and no delays, it is possible to compute
efficiently even an optimal Steiner forest [7]. Hence, in this case we obtain a separable
protocol with PoS of 1 in polynomial time. We finally demonstrate that the specific setting
of n-series-parallel graphs is in some sense necessary: Even for generalized series-parallel
graphs we give a counterexample showing that a black-box reduction is impossible to achieve.
1.2 Preliminaries and Related Work
Cooperative cost sharing games have been studied over the last decades for a variety of
combinatorial optimization problems, such as minimum spanning tree [10], Steiner tree [29,30,
46,52], facility location [28], vertex cover [22], and many more. Cooperative cost sharing games
have interesting implications for (group-)strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms [41,42,47,48].
For Bayesian cost-sharing mechanisms there even exist efficient black-box reductions from
algorithm to mechanism design [27]. A major difference to our work is that cooperative cost
sharing is not separable.
The most prominent example of a separable cost sharing protocol is the fair share protocol,
in which the cost of each resource is divided in equal shares among the players that use it. This
protocol is also anonymous, and it implies that the resulting game is a congestion game [50].
It guarantees the smallest PoS within a class of anonymous protocols [17]. The fair share
protocol has attracted a serious amount of research interest over the last decade [1, 4, 8, 33],
especially the notorious open problem of a constant PoS for connection games in undirected
graphs [9, 23, 25, 43, 44]. However, as a significant drawback - outside of the domain of
undirected connection games - the PoS is often as large as Ω(logn), e.g. [17, 32].
More general separable protocols have been studied mostly in terms of the price of
anarchy, e.g., for scheduling (or matroid games) [6, 13, 19, 24, 53] or single-source network
design with [20,21] and without uncertainty [17]. The best result here is a price of anarchy
(and stability) of 2 via Prim-Sharing [17], a protocol inspired by Prim’s MST algorithm. A
protocol with logarithmic PoS was shown for capacitated UFL games [37].
We observe that separable protocols with low PoS can be obtained using results for
cost sharing games with so-called “arbitrary sharing”, where effectively players pay the cost
increment when changing their strategy (see [36] for a formal definition). A PNE for arbitrary
sharing can be translated directly into a PNE for a suitable separable cost sharing protocol.
A simple proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the full version of this paper [34].
I Proposition 1. If for a cost sharing model, the non-cooperative game with arbitrary sharing
has a PNE, then there is a separable cost sharing protocol with the same PNE.
This implies existence of separable protocols with optimal PNE and PoS 1 for a variety
of classes of games, including matroid games with uniform discrete-concave costs [36],
uncapacitated facility location with fixed [14] and discrete-concave costs [39], connection
games (single-source [5, 38] and other classes [2, 3, 40]) with fixed costs, and more. However,
the large majority of these results are inefficient, i.e., there is no polynomial-time algorithm
that computes the required optimal equilibrium.
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Alternatively, one may resort to approximate equilibria in games with arbitrary sharing
that are efficiently computable. The most prominent technique works via reducing costs
by an additive value ε to ensure polynomial running time (put forward for single-source
connection games in [5] and used in much of the follow-up work [2, 3, 14, 38]). This approach
does not translate to separable protocols, since a player must eventually contribute to all
resources. This is impossible for the model we consider here.
2 Separable Cost Sharing Protocols
We are given a finite set N of players and a finite set E of resources. Each player i ∈ N is
associated with a predefined family of subsets Si ⊆ 2E from which player i needs to pick at
least one. The space of strategy profiles is denoted by S := ×i∈NSi. For S ∈ S we denote
by Ne(S) = {i ∈ N : e ∈ Si} the set of players that use resource e. Every resource e ∈ E
has a fixed cost ce ≥ 0, e ∈ E that is assumed to be shareable by the players. In addition
to the shareable costs, there are player-specific constant costs di,e ≥ 0, i ∈ N, e ∈ E that
are not shareable. If player i chooses subset Si, then the player-specific costs
∑
e∈Si di,e
must be paid completely by player i. The total cost of a profile S is defined as C(S) =∑





A cost sharing protocol assigns cost share functions ξi,e : S → R≥0 for all i ∈ N and
e ∈ E and thus induces the strategic game (N,S, ξ). For a player i, her total private cost
of strategy Si in profile S is πi(S) :=
∑
e∈Si (ξi,e(S) + di,e). We assume that every player
picks a strategy in order to minimize her private cost. A prominent solution concept in non-
cooperative game theory are pure Nash equilibria. Using standard notation in game theory,
for a strategy profile S ∈ S we denote by (S′i, S−i) := (S1, . . . , Si−1, S′i, Si+1, . . . , Sn) ∈ S
the profile that arises if only player i deviates to strategy S′i ∈ Si. A profile is a pure Nash
equilibrium (PNE) if for all i ∈ N it holds πi(S) ≤ πi(S′i, S−i) for all S′i ∈ Si.
In order to be practically relevant, cost sharing protocols need to satisfy several desiderata.
In this regard, separable cost sharing protocols are defined as follows [17].
I Definition 2 (Cost Sharing Protocols and Enforceability). A cost sharing protocol is
1. stable if it induces only games that admit at least one pure Nash equilibrium.




ξi,e(S) and ξi,e(S) = 0 for all i 6∈ Ne(S).
3. separable if it is stable, budget-balanced and induces only games for which in any two
profiles S, S′ ∈ S for every resource e ∈ E,
Ne(S) = Ne(S′)⇒ ξi,e(S) = ξi,e(S′) for all i ∈ Ne(S).
4. polynomial time computable, if the cost sharing functions ξ can be computed in polynomial
time in the encoding length of the cost sharing game.
We call a strategy profile S enforceable, if there is a separable protocol inducing S as a PNE.
Separability means that for any two profiles S, S′ the cost shares on e are the same if the
set of players using e remains unchanged. Still, separable protocols can assign cost share
functions that are specifically tailored to a given congestion model, for example based on an
optimal profile. In this paper, we are additionally interested in polynomial-time computable
protocols that we introduce here.
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3 Matroid Games
In this section, we consider matroid games. As usual in matroid theory, we will write
Bi instead of Si, and B instead of S, when considering matroid games. The tuple M =
(N,E,B, (ce)e∈E , (di,e)e∈E,i∈N ) is called a matroid game if E =
⋃
i∈N Ei, and each set system
Bi ⊆ 2Ei forms the base set of some matroidMi = (Ei,Bi). While seemingly abstract, the
class includes several prominent application domains, such as UFL games. In a UFL game,
the resources are facilities (e.g. common transport hubs) and the players incur delay di,e in
addition to their cost shares for opening used facilities. Every player i chooses exactly one
resource, that is |Bi| = 1 for all Bi ∈ Bi and i ∈ N and hence Bi corresponds to a uniform
matroid of rank one. Recall that every base B of a matroid Mi = (Ei,Bi) has the same
cardinality which we denote with rki (the rank ofMi).
In the following, instead of fixed costs on the resources, we allow for subadditive cost
functions ce : 2N → R≥0, e ∈ E. ce is called subadditive, if it satisfies (1) ce(S) ≤ ce(T )
for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N , and (2) ce(S + {i}) ≤ ce(S) + ce({i}) for all S ⊂ N, i ∈ N . Note
that subadditive functions include fixed costs, but also discrete concave costs, where the
nondecreasing cost ce : N → R≥0 depends on the number of players using e and satisfies
ce(x + δ) − ce(x) ≥ ce(y + δ) − ce(y)∀x ≤ y; x, y, δ ∈ N. As such, in the discrete concave
setting, all players have the same weight of 1, whereas subadditive costs also allow for different
weights (as in weighted congestion games). We furthermore assume ce(∅) = 0, e ∈ E.
Let us denote the cost of the cheapest alternative of player i to resource e for profile B ∈ B
by ∆ei (B) := minf∈E,Bi+f−e∈Bi (ce(Bi + f − e,B−i) + di,f ). Here we use the simplified
notations Bi +f − e := Bi∪{f}\{e} and ce(B) := ce(Ne(B)). We recapitulate the following
characterization of enforceable strategy profiles (obtained in [37], where also a cost sharing
protocol inducing the enforceable profile as a PNE is given).1
I Lemma 3. A profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn) is enforceable iff the following two properties are
satisfied. Note that (D1) implies that each summand ∆ei (B)− di,e in (D2) is nonnegative.




(∆ei (B)− di,e) for all e ∈ E. (D2)
I Remark. The characterization was used in [37] to prove that an optimal collection of bases
is enforceable. This implies a PoS of 1 for a separable cost sharing protocol that relies on
the optimal profile. As such, the protocol is not efficiently computable (unless P = NP ).
In the following, we devise a black-box reduction in Algorithm 1. It takes as input an
arbitrary collection of bases B and transforms them in polynomial time into an enforceable
set of bases B′ of no larger cost. We define for each i ∈ N, e ∈ E a virtual cost value
vei := ce({i}) + di,e, and for each B ∈ B, i ∈ N, e ∈ E a virtual deviation cost ∆̄ei (B) :=
minf∈E,Bi+f−e∈Bi v
f
i . The algorithm now iteratively checks whether (D1) and (D2) from
Lemma 3 hold true (in fact it checks this condition for smaller values on the right hand side
given by the virtual values), and if not, exchanges one element of some player. We show that
the algorithm terminates with an enforceable profile after polynomially many steps.
I Theorem 4. Let B be a strategy profile for a matroid congestion model with subadditive
costs. There is an enforceable profile B′ with C(B′) ≤ C(B) that can be computed in at most
1The original characterization in [37] was proven for weighted players and load-dependent non-decreasing
cost functions but the proof also works for subadditive cost functions.
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Algorithm 1: Transforming any profile B into an enforceable profile B′
Input: Congestion model (N,B, c, d) and profile B ∈ B
Output: Enforceable profile B′ with C(B′) ≤ C(B).
1 Set B′ ← B
2 while there is e ∈ E that satisfies at least one of the following conditions:








3 if (1) holds true for some i ∈ Ne(B′) then




5 Update B′i ← B′i + fi − e
6 else if (2) holds true then
7 while (2) holds true on e do
8 Pick i ∈ Ne(B′) with vei > ∆̄ei (B′)




10 Update B′i ← B′i + fi − e
n ·m · rk(B) iterations of the outer while-loop in Algorithm 1, where rk(B) = maxi∈N rki.
Furthermore, each such iteration needs O(n ·m · rk(B) ·Q+ (m+ n) ·Q′) time, where Q and
Q′ denote the maximum complexities of the independence oracles for the players’ strategies,
and of the value oracles for the subadditive cost functions of the resources, respectively.
Proof. First, observe that if (D1) and (D2) from Lemma 3 hold true for smaller values
0 ≤ ∆̄ei (B) ≤ ∆ei (B), i ∈ N, e ∈ E, then the profile B is also enforceable. Hence, if the
algorithm terminates, the resulting strategy profile B′ will be enforceable.
To show that the algorithm is well-defined, we only need to check Line 8. By subadditivity
we get
∑
i∈Ne(B′) ce({i}) > ce(B







there is an i ∈ Ne(B′) with ce({i}) + di,e > ∆̄ei (B′).
We now bound the running time. Consider player i and the matroid bases Bi. We
interpret a basis Bi ∈ Bi as distributing exactly rki unit sized packets over the resources in
E. This way, we can interpret the algorithm as iteratively moving packets away from those
resources e ∈ E for which either (1) or (2) holds true. We give each packet a unique ID
ik, k = 1, . . . , rki. For Bi ∈ Bi, let eik denote the resource on which packet ik is located. We
now analyse the two types of packet movements during the execution of the algorithm. For
a packet movement executed in Line 5 of Algorithm 1, we have di,e > ∆̄ei (B′), thus, when
packet ik located on e = eik is moved to fi, it holds that v
eik
i = vei ≥ di,e > ∆̄ei (B′) = v
fi
i . For
packet movements executed in Line 10, then by the choice of player i ∈ Ne(B′) (see Line 8)
for the corresponding packet ik it holds v
eik
i = vei > ∆̄ei (B′) = v
fi
i . In both cases we obtain
vei > v
fi
i . Hence, every movement of a single packet ik is in strictly decreasing order of virtual
value of the resource. Note that the virtual cost value vei does not depend on profile B. Thus,
there are at most m different virtual cost values that a packet ik of player i can experience,
and thus packet ik can move at most m− 1 times. The following is an upper bound on the
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total number of packet movements for all players
∑
i∈N rki ·(m− 1) ≤ n ·m · rk(B). Thus, the
number of iterations of the outer while-loop can be at most that value. It is straightforward
to observe the stated complexity of one iteration of the while-loop.
It is left to argue that the final output B′ has cost at most C(B). We prove this inductively
by the different types of packet movements. Consider first a packet movement of type (1). Let
B and B′ be the profiles before and after packet ik has been moved from e to fi, respectively.
We obtain (by using subadditivity and assumption (1))
C(B′)− C(B) = (cfi(B′)− cfi(B) + di,fi)− (ce(B)− ce(B′) + di,e)
≤ cfi({i}) + di,fi − (ce(B)− ce(B′) + di,e)
= ∆̄ei (B)− di,e + (ce(B′)− ce(B)) ≤ ∆̄ei (B)− di,e < 0.
Now consider packet movements of type (2). We treat all movements occurring in one run of
the while loop in Line 7. Let B denote the profile before and B′ after all these movements.
Let Te(B) ⊆ Ne(B) denote the set of those players whose packet ik on e is moved to fi
for i ∈ Te(B) during the while loop. Let Fe(B) =
⋃
i∈Te(B){fi} and for i ∈ Te(B) define
Tfi(B) = {j ∈ Te(B) | fj = fi}. We derive some useful observations. Before entering the
















































































where the first inequality follows from subadditivity, and the last inequality from (5). J
4 Single-Source Connection Games without Delays
In this section, we study connection games in an undirected graph G = (V,E) with a common
source vertex s ∈ V . Every player i wants to connect a player-specific terminal node ti ∈ V
to s. Consequently, every strategy Pi of player i is an (s, ti)-path in G. We denote the set of
paths for player i by Pi and the set of profiles by P . Furthermore we focus on fixed shareable
costs ce ≥ 0 and no player-specific delays di,e = 0, for all i ∈ N , e ∈ E.
For single-source games with delays, a black-box reduction is impossible to achieve, since
one can construct instances where no optimal solution is enforceable. To see this, take any
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multi-source multi-terminal connection game and introduce a new auxiliary source vertex
s. Then connect s to each si with an auxiliary edge ei, which has cost cei = 0 and delays
di,ei = 0, dj,ei = M for all other players j (for some prohibitively large constant M). Now
in any equilibrium and any optimal state of the resulting game, player i will choose an
(s, ti)-path which begins with edge ei. Moreover, ei does not generate additional cost for
player i. As such, the optimal solutions, the Nash equilibria, and their total costs correspond
exactly to the ones of the original multi-source game. For the general multi-source case,
there are instances with no enforceable optimal solution (even for only two players, see [35]).
For connection games with fixed shareable costs and no delays, the state of the art for
polynomial-time cost sharing protocols is the Prim-Sharing protocol with a PoS of 2 [17].
Moreover, it is known that an optimal tree profile (a profile in which the union of player paths
constitute a tree) is always enforceable [5,17]. Our result for polynomial-time computation of
cheap enforceable profiles, stated in Theorem 5, represents a significant generalization – for
any (possibly non-enforceable) tree profile, Algorithm 2 (given in detail in [34]) computes an
enforceable profile that can only be cheaper in terms of total cost. Moreover, by combining
the result with existing approximation algorithms, we obtain a protocol with PoS of 1.39.
I Theorem 5. Let P be a strategy profile for a single-source connection game with fixed costs.
There is an enforceable profile P ′ with C(P ′) ≤ C(P ) that can be computed by Algorithm 2
in polynomial time.
It is straightforward that for fixed costs we can transform each profile P into a tree
profile P̂ , in which the union of player paths constitute a tree T , without increasing the cost.
Over the course of the algorithm, we adjust this tree and construct a cost sharing for it in a
bottom-up fashion. The approach has similarities to an approach for obtaining approximate
equilibria for single-source cost sharing games with arbitrary sharing [5]. However, our
algorithm exploits crucial properties of separable protocols, thereby providing an exact Nash
equilibrium and polynomial running time.
When designing a separable protocol based on a state P̂ , we can always assume that
when a player i deviates unilaterally to one or more edges e ∈ G \ P̂i, she needs to pay all of
ce. As such, player i always picks a collection of shortest paths with respect to ce between
pairs of nodes on her current path P̂i. All these paths in G are concisely represented in the
algorithm as “auxiliary edges”. The algorithm initially sets up an auxiliary graph Ĝ given by
T and the set of auxiliary edges based on P̂ . It adjusts the tree T by removing edges of T
and adding auxiliary edges in a structured fashion.
We first show in the following Lemma 6 (for a proof see [34]) that this adjustment
procedure improves the total cost of the tree, and that the final tree T̂ is enforceable in Ĝ.
In the corresponding cost sharing, every auxiliary edge contained in T̂ is completely paid for
by a single player that uses it. In the subsequent proof of Theorem 5, we only need to show
that for the auxiliary edges in T̂ , the edge costs of the corresponding shortest paths in G can
be assigned to the players such that we obtain an equilibrium in G. The proof shows that
the profile P ′ evolving in this way is enforceable in G and has cost no larger than P .
I Lemma 6. Algorithm 2 computes a cost sharing of a feasible tree T̂ in the graph Ĝ. The
total cost C(T̂ ) ≤ C(T ), every auxiliary edge in T̂ is paid for by a single player, and the
corresponding profile P̂ is enforceable in Ĝ.
Proof of Theorem 5. The previous lemma shows that the algorithm computes a cost sharing
of a tree T̂ in Ĝ, such that every player is happy with the path P̂i and every auxiliary edge
in T̂ is paid for completely by a single player. We now transform P̂ into P ′ by replacing each
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auxiliary edge e = (u, v) ∈ P̂i by the corresponding shortest path P (u, v) in G. We denote
by Ei the set of edges introduced in the shortest paths for auxiliary edges in P̂i. For the
total cost of the resulting profile we have that C(P ′) ≤ C(P̂ ) ≤ C(P ), since the sets Ei can
overlap with each other or the non-auxiliary edges of T̂ .
We show that P ′ is enforceable by transforming the cost sharing constructed in function
ĉ into separable cost sharing functions as follows. Initially, set ξi,e(P ′) = 0 for all e ∈ E
and i ∈ N . Then, for each non-auxiliary edge e ∈ T̂ we assign ξi,e(P ′) = ĉe(i) if e ∈ P̂i and
ξi,e(P ′) = 0 otherwise. Finally, number players arbitrarily from 1 to n and proceed in that
order. For player i, consider the edges in Ei. For every e ∈ Ei, if
∑
j<i ξj,e(P ′) = 0, then set
ξi,e(P ′) = ce.
This yields a budget-balanced assignment for state P ′. As usual, if a player i deviates
in P ′ from P ′i to P ′′i , we can assume player i is assigned to pay the full cost ce for every
edge e ∈ P ′′i \ P ′i . To show that there is no profitable deviation from P ′, we first consider
a thought experiment, where every edge in Ei comes as a separate edge bought by player
i. Then, clearly P ′ is enforceable – the cost of P ′i with ξ is exactly the same as the cost of
P̂ with ĉ in Ĝ. Moreover, any deviation P ′′i can be interpreted as an (s, ti)-path in Ĝ by
replacing all subpaths consisting of non-auxiliary edges in P ′′ by the corresponding auxiliary
edge of Ĝ. As such, the cost of P ′′i is exactly the same as the cost of the corresponding
deviation in Ĝ. Now, there is not a separate copy for every edge in Ei. The set Ei can
overlap with other sets Ej and/or non-auxiliary edges. Then player i might not need to pay
the full cost on some e ∈ Ei. Note, however, every edge for which player i pays less than ce
is present in P ′i as well. Hence, P ′′i cannot improve over P ′i due to this property. J
The result continues to hold for various generalizations. For example, we can immediately
apply the arguments in directed graphs, where every player i seeks to establish a directed
path between ti and s. Moreover, the proof can also be applied readily for a group-connection
game, where each player wants to establish a directed path to s from at least one node of a
set Vi ⊂ V . For this game, we simply add a separate super-terminal ti for every player i and
draw a directed edge of cost 0 from ti to every node in Vi.
I Corollary 7. Let P be a strategy profile for a single-source group-connection game in
directed graphs with fixed costs. There is an enforceable profile P ′ with C(P ′) ≤ C(P ) that
can be computed by Algorithm 2 in polynomial time.
5 Connection Games and Graph Structure
In this section, we consider connection games played in undirected graphs G = (V,E) with
player-specific source-terminal pairs. Each player i ∈ N has a source-terminal-pair (si, ti).
Consequently, every strategy Pi of player i is an (si, ti)-path in G. We denote the set of
paths for player i by Pi.
Note that we can assume w.l.o.g. that (G, (s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)) is irredundant, meaning
that each edge and each vertex of G is contained in at least one (si, ti)-path for some player
i ∈ N (nodes and edges not used by any player can easily be recognized (and then deleted)
by Algorithm Irredundant in [34]; adapted from Algorithm 1 in [18]).
For the special case without delays, enforceability was characterized via an LP in [35]. We
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ξi,e ≤ ce∀e ∈ E with Ne(P ) 6= ∅,
∑
e∈Pi\P ′i





(ce + di,e) ∀P ′i ∈ Pi ∀i ∈ N (NE)
ξi,e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ Pi ∀i ∈ N
I Theorem 8. P is enforceable iff there is an optimal solution (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi for LP(P ) with∑
i∈Ne(P ) ξi,e = ce ∀e ∈ E with Ne(P ) 6= ∅. (BB)
Given an optimal solution (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi for LP(P ) with the property (BB), the profile P
becomes a PNE in the game induced by ξ, which assigns for each i ∈ N and e ∈ E and each
strategy profile P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P ′n) the following cost shares (these cost shares resemble those
introduced in [53]; the proof that P is a PNE can be directly adapted from [35]):
ξi,e(P ′) =

ξi,e, if i ∈ Se(P ′) = Se(P ),
ce, if i ∈ (Se(P ′) \ Se(P )) and i = min(Se(P ′) \ Se(P )),
ce, if i ∈ Se(P ′) ( Se(P ) and i = minSe(P ′),
0, else.
We now introduce a subclass of generalized series-parallel graphs for which we design a
polynomial time black-box reduction.
I Definition 9 (n-series-parallel graph). An irredundant graph (G, (s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)) is
n-series-parallel if, for all i ∈ N , the subgraph Gi (induced by Pi) is created by a sequence
of series and/or parallel operations starting from the edge si − ti. For an edge e = u− v, a
series operation replaces it by a new vertex w and two edges u−w,w−v; a parallel operation
adds to e = u− v a parallel edge e′ = u− v.
I Theorem 10. If (G, (s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)) is n-series-parallel, the following holds:
(1) Given an arbitrary strategy profile P , an enforceable strategy profile P ′ with cost C(P ′) ≤
C(P ), and corresponding cost share functions ξ, can be computed in polynomial time.
(2) For all cost functions c, d, every optimal strategy profile of (G, (s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn), c, d)
is enforceable.
(3) For all edge costs c, an optimal Steiner forest of (G, (s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn), c) can be
computed in polynomial time.
Proof Sketch for Theorem 10. We first describe how to compute, given an arbitrary profile
P = (P1, . . . , Pn), an enforceable strategy profile with cost at most C(P ). Assume that P is
not enforceable, and let (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi be an optimal solution for LP(P ). In the following,
we denote the variables (ξi,e)i∈N,e∈Pi as cost shares, although they do not correspond to a
budget-balanced cost sharing protocol (since P is not enforceable). There is at least one
edge f which is not completely paid, i.e.
∑
i∈Nf (P ) ξi,f < cf holds. The optimality of the
cost shares implies that each player i ∈ Nf (P ) has an alternative path P ′i with f /∈ P ′i
and equality in the corresponding LP(P )-inequality (so-called tight alternative of player i
that substitutes f). Furthermore, if the path Pi of player i contains more than one edge
which is not completely paid, there is a tight alternative P ′i for player i which substitutes all
non-paid edges. Figure 1 illustrates this for the case that Pi (straight edges) contains the
three non-paid edges f, g, h, and player i substitutes them by using P ′i (thick edges).
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si tifg h
Figure 1 Illustration for substitution of nonpaid edges.
The high-level idea of the algorithm now is that all players with unpaid edges in their
paths deviate from those edges by using tight alternatives until we reach a strategy profile
in which all edges are completely paid. This strategy profile will then be enforceable and
cheaper than P . In the following we explain this in more detail. Let P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P ′n) be the
strategy profile which results from P if all players with unpaid edges in their paths substitute
all these edges by a tight alternative path (as described above). Furthermore we define cost
shares (again not nec. budget-balanced) for P ′ (for each player i ∈ N, e ∈ P ′i ):
ξi,e(P ′) =
{
ξi,e, for e ∈ P ′i ∩ Pi,




′) ≥ ce holds for all edges e with Ne(P ′) 6= ∅, the profile P ′ has the
desired properties: The cost of P ′ is strictly smaller than P since the private costs of
the players remain unchanged if they use tight alternatives. Furthermore the cost shares
(ξi,e(P ′))i∈N,e∈P ′
i
induce a feasible solution of LP(P ′) with (BB); thus P ′ is enforceable (we
possibly need to decrease some cost shares to get a feasible solution of LP(P ′)).
It remains to consider the case that there is at least one edge f which is not completely
paid, i.e. for which
∑
i∈Nf (P ′) ξi,f (P
′) < cf holds. We can show that all users of nonpaid
edges again have tight alternatives which substitute those edges, therefore we can again
update the strategy profile (resulting in P ′′) and the corresponding cost shares. If now all
edges are completely paid, P ′′ has the desired properties. Proceeding in this manner, we
can show that one finally reaches a strategy profile for which all edges are completely paid;
thus it is enforceable and cheaper than the profile P . Algorithm n-SePa in [34] summarizes
the described procedure. To complete the proof of the first statement of Theorem 10, it
remains to show that P ′ and ξ can be computed in polynomial time, i.e. Algorithm n-SePa
has polynomial running time. This follows from two facts. First, the number of strategy
profiles that we have to consider until we reach the desired strategy profile is bounded by |P |,
the number of edges in the union of the paths P1, . . . , Pn. Second, we can solve LP(P ) in
polynomial time. To this end we show that, for every player i, we do not need to consider all
paths P ′i ∈ Pi in (NE) of LP(P ), which can be exponentially many paths, but only a set of
alternatives Ai of polynomial cardinality. Algorithm Alternatives(i) in [34] computes this
set of alternatives. This completes the proof sketch for the first statement of Theorem 10.
Our analysis of the cost of P ′ immediately implies that every optimal strategy profile has
to be enforceable: Otherwise Algorithm n-SePa computes a strategy profile with strictly
smaller cost; contradiction. Thus the second statement of Theorem 10 holds.
The third statement follows from [7] where it is shown that an optimal Steiner forest can
be computed in polynomial time if the underlying graph has treewidth at most 2. We show
that every n-series-parallel graph is generalized series-parallel, and since these graphs have
treewidth at most 2, the desired result follows. For a full proof of Theorem 10, see [34]. J
I Remark. The first two results of Theorem 10 can be generalized to nonnegative, non-
decreasing and discrete-concave shareable edge cost functions. However, we do not know
whether or not polynomial running time can be guaranteed.
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We now demonstrate in Theorem 11 (for a proof see [34]) that the assumption of n-series-
parallel graphs is in some sense well justified. Recall that a generalized series-parallel graph
is created by a sequence of series, parallel, and/or add operations starting from a single edge,
where an add operation adds a new vertex w and connects it to an existing vertex v by the
edge w−v. The proofs of Theorem 10 and Theorem 11 show that the n-series-parallel graphs
form a proper subclass of the generalized series-parallel graphs.
I Theorem 11. For n ≥ 3 players, there is a generalized series-parallel graph with fixed edge
costs and no player-specific delays, so that the unique optimal Steiner forest is not enforceable.
Therefore, a black-box reduction as for n-series-parallel graphs is impossible for generalized
series-parallel graphs (even without player-specific delays).
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